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†
Libertarian Paternalism
By RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
Many economists are libertarians and con-
sider the term “paternalistic” to be derogatory.
Most would think that the phrase libertarian
paternalism is an oxymoron. The modest goal of
this essay is to encourage economists to rethink
their views on paternalism. We believe that the
anti-paternalistic fervor expressed by many
economists is based on a combination of a false
assumption and at least two misconceptions.
The false assumption is that people always (usu-
ally?) make choices that are in their best inter-
est. This claim is either tautological, and
therefore uninteresting, or testable. We claim
that it is testable and false—indeed, obviously
false.
The ﬁrst misconception is that there are via-
ble alternatives to paternalism. In many situa-
tions, some organization or agent must make a
choice that will affect the choices of some other
people. The point applies to both private and
public actors. Consider the problem facing the
director of a company cafeteria who discovers
that the order in which food is arranged inﬂu-
ences the choices people make. To simplify,
consider three alternative strategies: (1) she
could make choices that she thinks would make
the customers best off; (2) she could make
choices at random; or (3) she could maliciously
choose those items that she thinks would make
the customers as obese as possible. Option 1
appears to be paternalistic, which it is, but
would anyone advocate options 2 or 3?
The second misconception is that paternalism
always involves coercion. As the cafeteria ex-
ample illustrates, the choice of which order to
present food items does not coerce anyone to do
anything, yet one might prefer some orders to
others on paternalistic grounds. Would many
object to putting the fruit before the desserts at
an elementary school cafeteria if the outcome
were to increase the consumption ratio of apples
to Twinkies? Is this question fundamentally dif-
ferent if the customers are adults? If no coercion
is involved, we think that some types of pater-
nalism should be acceptable to even the most
ardent libertarian. We call such actions libertar-
ian paternalism.
In our understanding, a policy counts as “pa-
ternalistic” if it is selected with the goal of
inﬂuencing the choices of affected parties in a
way that will make those parties better off. We
intend “better off” to be measured as objectively
as possible, and we clearly do not always equate
revealed preference with welfare. That is, we
emphasize the possibility that in some cases
individuals make inferior choices, choices that
they would change if they had complete infor-
mation, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no
lack of willpower. Once it is understood that
some organizational decisions are inevitable,
that a form of paternalism cannot be avoided,
and that the alternatives to paternalism (such as
choosing options to make people sick, obese, or
generally worse off) are unattractive, we can
abandon the less interesting question of whether
to be paternalistic or not and turn to the more
constructive question of how to choose among
paternalistic options.
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175I. Are Choices Rational?
The presumption that individual choices
should be free from interference is usually
based on the assumption that people do a good
job of making choices, or at least that they do a
far better job than third parties could do. As far
as we can tell, there is little empirical support
for this claim. Research by psychologists and
economists over the past three decades has
raised questions about the rationality of the
judgments and decisions that individuals make.
People do not exhibit rational expectations, fail
to make forecasts that are consistent with
Bayes’ rule, use heuristics that lead them to
make systematic blunders, exhibit preference
reversals (that is, they prefer A to B and Bt oA )
and make different choices depending on the
wording of the problem (for many examples,
see the two recent collections of papers by
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky [2000]
and by Thomas Gilovich et al. [2002]). Further-
more, in the context of intertemporal choice,
people exhibit dynamic inconsistency, valuing
present consumption much more than future
consumption. In other words, people have self-
control problems (see the other papers in this
session [James Choi et al., 2003b; Ted
O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, 2003] for de-
tails and references).
Many economists are skeptical of some of
these ﬁndings, thinking that people may do a
better job of choosing in the “real world” than
they do in the laboratory. However, studies of
actual choices for high stakes reveal many of
the same problems. For example, the Surgeon
General reports that 61 percent of Americans
are either overweight or obese. Given the ad-
verse effects obesity has on health, it is hard to
claim that Americans are eating optimal diets.
Another illustration comes from the domain
of savings behavior. Shlomo Benartzi and Tha-
ler (2002) investigate how much investors like
the portfolios they have selected in their
deﬁned-contribution savings plans. Employees
volunteered to share their portfolio choices with
the investigators (by bringing a copy of their
most recent statement to the lab). They were
then shown the probability distributions of ex-
pected retirement income for three investment
portfolios just labeled A, B, and C. Unbe-
knownst to the subjects, the three portfolios
were their own and portfolios mimicking the
average and median choices of their fellow em-
ployees. The distributions of expected returns
were computed using the software of Financial
Engines, the ﬁnancial information company
founded by William Sharpe. On average, the
subjects rated the average portfolio equally with
their own portfolio, and they judged the median
portfolio to be signiﬁcantly more attractive than
their own. Indeed, only 20 percent of the sub-
jects preferred their own portfolio to the me-
dian portfolio. Apparently, people do not gain
much by choosing investment portfolios for
themselves.
II. Is Paternalism Inevitable?
As the cafeteria line example discussed above
illustrates, planners are forced to make some
design choices. A simple and important exam-
ple is the selection of a “default option” to
determine what happens if an agent fails to
choose for himself. In a fully rational world
such design choices would have little effect (at
least in high-stakes situations) because agents
would simply choose the best option for them
regardless of the default. However, numerous
experiments illustrate that there is a very strong
“status quo” bias (see William Samuelson and
Richard Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman et al.,
1991). The existing arrangement, whether set
out by private institutions or by government,
tends to stick.
One illustration of this phenomenon comes
from studies of automatic enrollment in 401(k)
employee savings plans. Most 401(k) plans use
an opt-in design. When employees ﬁrst become
eligible to participate in the 401(k) plan, they
receive some plan information and an enroll-
ment form that must be completed in order to
join. Under the alternative of automatic enroll-
ment, employees receive the same information
but are told that unless they opt out, they will be
enrolled in the plan (with some default options
for savings rates and asset allocation). In com-
panies that offer a “match” (the employer
matches the employee’s contributions accord-
session the common goal of devising policies that help some
agents who are making some mistake, while minimizing the
costs imposed on others.
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up to some cap), most employees eventually do
join the plan, but enrollments occur much
sooner under automatic enrollment. For exam-
ple, Brigitte Madrian and Dennis Shea (2001)
found that initial enrollments jumped from 49
percent to 86 percent, and Choi et al. (2002) ﬁnd
similar results for other companies.
Should the adoption of automatic enrollment
be considered paternalistic? And, if so, should it
therefore be seen as a kind of ofﬁcious med-
dling with employee preferences? We answer
these questions yes and no respectively. If the
employer thinks (correctly, we believe) that
most employees would prefer to join the 401(k)
plan if they took the time to think about it and
did not lose the enrollment form, then by choos-
ing automatic enrollment they are acting pater-
nalistically. They are attempting to steer
employees’ choices in directions that will pro-
mote employees’ welfare. But since no one is
forced to do anything, we think this steering
should be considered unobjectionable to liber-
tarians. The employer must choose some set of
rules, and either plan affects employees’
choices. No law of nature says that, in the
absence of an afﬁrmative election by employ-
ees, zero percent of earnings will go into a
retirement plan. Because both plans alter
choices, neither one can be said, more than the
other, to count as a form of objectionable
meddling.
Quick-minded readers might be tempted to
think that there is a way out of this dilemma.
Employers could avoid choosing a default if
they required employees to make a choice, ei-
ther in or out. But some thought reveals that this
is not at all a way out of the dilemma; rather, it
is simply another option among many that the
employer can elect. In fact, Choi et al. (2003a)
ﬁnd that this rule increases enrollments (relative
to the opt-in rule) though by not as much as
automatic enrollment. Furthermore, the very re-
quirement that employees make a choice has a
paternalistic element. Many employees do not
want to have to make a choice (and would
choose not to have to do so). Should employers
really force them to choose?
Why, exactly, does the setting of defaults
have such large effects? With respect to sav-
ings, the designated default plan apparently car-
ries a certain legitimacy for many employees,
perhaps because it seems to have resulted from
some conscious thought about what makes most
sense for most people. But there is a separate
explanation, involving inertia. For any em-
ployee, a change from any status quo entails
time and effort, and many people seem to prefer
to avoid both of these, especially if they are
prone to procrastination. When default rules are
“sticky” and affect choices as a result, inertia
might be the major reason.
For present purposes, the choice among these
various explanations does not much matter. The
point is only that paternalism, in the form of
effects on individual choices, is often unavoid-
able. When paternalism seems absent, it is usu-
ally because the starting point appears so natural
and obvious that its preference-shaping effects
are invisible to most observers. But those ef-
fects are nonetheless there. Of course it is usu-
ally good not to block choices, and we do not
mean to defend non-libertarian paternalism
here. But in an important respect, the anti-
paternalistic position is incoherent.
III. Beyond the Inevitable (but Still Libertarian)
The inevitability of paternalism is most clear
when the planner has to choose default rules. It
is reasonable to ask whether the planner should
go beyond the inevitable. Take the cafeteria
example discussed above. Putting the fruit be-
fore the desserts is a fairly mild intervention. A
more intrusive step would be to place the des-
serts in another location altogether, so that din-
ers have to get up and get a dessert after they
have ﬁnished the rest of their meal. This step
raises the transactions costs of eating dessert,
and according to a standard economic analysis
the proposal is unattractive: it seems to make
dessert-eaters worse off and no one better off.
But once self-control costs are incorporated, we
can see that some diners would prefer this ar-
rangement, namely, those who would eat a des-
sert if it were put in front of them but would
resist temptation if given a little help. To the
extent that the dessert location is not hard to
ﬁnd, and no choice is forbidden, this approach
meets libertarian muster.
In the domain of employee savings, Thaler
and Benartzi (2003) have proposed a method of
increasing contributions to 401(k) plans that
also meets the libertarian test. Under this plan,
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invited to sign up for a program in which their
contributions to the savings plan are increased
annually whenever they get a raise. Once em-
ployees join the plan, they stay in until they opt
out or reach the maximum savings rate in the
plan. In the ﬁrst company to use this plan, the
employees who joined increased their savings
rates from 3.5 percent to 11.6 percent in a little
over two years (three raises). Very few of the
employees who join the plan drop out. This is
successful libertarian paternalism in action.
IV. How to Choose: The Toolbox
of the Libertarian Paternalist
How should sensible planners (a category we
mean to include anyone who must design plans
for others, from human-resource directors to
bureaucrats to kings) choose among possible
systems, given that some choice is necessary?
We suggest two approaches to this problem.
If feasible, a comparison of possible rules
should be done using a form of cost–beneﬁt
analysis. The goal of a cost–beneﬁt study would
be to measure the full ramiﬁcations of any de-
sign choice. To illustrate, take the example of
automatic enrollment. Under automatic enroll-
ment some employees will join the plan who
otherwise would not. Presumably, some are
made better off (especially if there is an em-
ployer match), but some may be made worse
off (e.g., those who are highly liquidity-
constrained). If the issue were just enrollment,
we would guess that the gains would exceed the
losses. We base this guess partly on revealed
choices. Most employees do join the plan even-
tually, and very few who are automatically en-
rolled opt out when they ﬁgure out what has
happened to them. We also judge that the costs
of having too little saved up for retirement are
typically greater than the costs of having saved
too much.
In many cases, however, the planner will be
unable to make a direct inquiry into welfare,
either because too little information is available
or because the costs of doing the analysis are
not warranted. The committed anti-paternalist
might say, in such cases, that people should
simply be permitted to choose as they see ﬁt.
We hope that we have said enough to show why
this response is unhelpful. What people choose
often depends on the starting point, and hence
the starting point cannot be selected by asking
what people choose. In these circumstances, the
libertarian paternalist would seek indirect prox-
ies for welfare: methods that test whether one or
another approach is welfare-promoting without
relying on unreliable guesswork about that
question. We suggest three possible methods.
First, the libertarian paternalist might select
the approach that the majority would choose if
explicit choices were required and revealed.
Useful though it is, this market-mimicking ap-
proach raises its own problems. Perhaps the
majority’s choices would be insufﬁciently in-
formed. Perhaps those choices, in fact, would
not promote the majority’s welfare. At least as a
presumption, however, it makes sense to follow
those choices if the planner knows what they
would be. A deeper problem is that the major-
ity’s choices might themselves be a function of
the starting point or the default rule. If so, the
problem of circularity dooms the market-
mimicking approach. But in some cases, at
least, the majority is likely to go one way or the
other regardless of the starting point; and to that
extent, the market-mimicking strategy seems
quite workable.
Second, the libertarian paternalist might se-
lect the approach that would force people to
make their choices explicit. This approach
might be chosen if the market-mimicking strat-
egy fails, either because of the circularity prob-
lem or because the planner does not know
which approach would in fact be chosen by the
majority. We have seen the possibility of forced
choices in the context of retirement plans; it
would be easy to ﬁnd other examples. Here too,
however, there is a risk that the choices that are
actually elicited will be inadequately informed
or will not promote welfare. In the case of
retirement plans, for example, forced choices
have been found to produce higher participa-
tion rates than requiring opt-ins, but lower
rates than requiring opt-outs. If it is likely that
automatic enrollment is welfare-promoting,
perhaps automatic enrollment should be pre-
ferred over forced choices. The only sugges-
tion is that, where the social planner is unsure
how to handle the welfare question, he might
devise a strategy that requires people to choose.
Third, the libertarian paternalist might select
the approach that minimizes the number of opt-
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of the 401(k) plan when they are automatically
enrolled, though many opt in under the standard
enrollment procedure. This is an ex post inquiry
into people’s preferences, in contrast to the ex
ante approach favored by the market-mimicking
strategy. With those numbers, there is reason to
think that automatic enrollment is better, if only
because more people are sufﬁciently satisﬁed to
leave it in place.
V. Conclusion
Our goal here has been to defend libertarian
paternalism, an approach that preserves free-
dom of choice but that authorizes both private
and public institutions to steer people in direc-
tions that will promote their welfare. Some kind
of paternalism is likely whenever such institu-
tions set out arrangements that will prevail un-
less people afﬁrmatively choose otherwise. In
these circumstances, the goal should be to avoid
random, arbitrary, or harmful effects and to
produce a situation that is likely to promote
people’s welfare, suitably deﬁned.
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